

OLL #
84-1715

April 23, 1984

Chrono

S. Symms

Dear Senator Symms:

Thank you for your April 11 letter to the President in which you and Senator Hatch expressed a number of your concerns regarding comments you received from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with respect to verifiability of the SALT II Treaty.

We appreciate knowing of your serious concerns in the matter of verifiability as it relates to both past and future arms agreements. Please know that your statement of concern has been shared with the President as well as his key foreign policy advisers. Let me assure you that your request to be advised of a schedule of reports on these problems under Section 37 of the Arms Control Act will be carefully reviewed.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Steven D. Symms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO/KRJ/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to Thomas Graham, Cong  
Affrs, ACDA - for DRAFT  
cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - FYI  
cc: w/copy of inc to Clair George, Legis  
Liaison, CIA - FYI

**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 11, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On September 16, 1982, we received a letter from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which contained two alarming revelations. First, the letter stated:

"The most recent analysis of the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty ... is a 1979 verification study. There are no current plans to carry out a systematic review and updating of these analyses."

We believe that it was a serious misjudgment for ACDA not to have restudied the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty, which even you yourself have stated is unverifiable.

Second, the letter also said:

"With regard to U.S. capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements ... the U.S. has experienced some degradation in the past, however specific programs designed to enhance current capabilities and offset such degradation have been instituted."

This too is a shocking admission. In view of reports that the huge Abalakovo ABM radar had been under construction for over two years before it was finally discovered last July, something must be seriously wrong with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification. We seek reassurance that corrective measures are currently effective.

Senior Administration officials have told us that any potential new START or INF treaties are likely to be as verifiable as SALT II. Hence you can understand our concern when we read in the September 16, 1982 letter the third alarming revelation, that:

"The Administration is currently engaged in an intensive study of the verification provisions which will be required for the START and INF proposals on the table in Geneva."

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Thus the ACDA has admitted that the U.S. has already proposed negotiating provisions without first establishing if they are verifiable.

Now we read in The Washington Post of January 19, 1984 that:

"Senior Administration officials [have concluded that] future arms agreements must be simpler than in the past, because monitoring of earlier pacts has turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated"

It is reasonable to conclude from this ACDA letter that the unratified SALT II Treaty may not be verifiable due to Soviet concealment measures, the imprecision of many provisions, and the degradation of U.S. National Technical Means of verification. Further, if the verifiability of INF and START may be comparable to SALT II, we believe that a study should be done to ascertain this.

Several possible failures to comply with Section 37 of the Arms Control And Disarmament Act may be involved in these acknowledged verification difficulties. First, the verifiability of SALT II should have been restudied by the Reagan Administration and reported to Congress. Second, any degradations in U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification should have been reported to Congress, and promptly corrected. Third, the verifiability of the U.S. START and INF proposals should have been studied prior to their submission to the Soviets, and reports should have been made to Congress. Section 37 states:


"It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement. In recognition of such policy and in order to assure that arms control proposals made or accepted by the United States can be adequately verified, the Director [i.e. of ACDA] shall report to the Congress, on a timely basis ... in the case of each element of any significant arms control proposal made to a foreign country by the United States ... [i.e. and] in the case of any arms control agreement or treaty that has entered into force, any significant degradation or alteration in the capacity of the United States to verify the various components of such agreement or treaty ..." (Emphasis added.)

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Please advise us of a schedule of reports on these problems under Section 37 of the Arms Control Act.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Steve Seamus". Below the main signature, there is a smaller, less legible handwritten note that appears to say "Chris Hatch".

CC: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director, ACDA  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, CIA